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What Happened to the Responsibility to Rebuild? 
Outi Keranen 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
While significant obstacles to the realisation of the responsibility to protect in practice remain, it 
has nonetheless made considerable progress in transforming from an idea to an emerging norm. At 
the same time, however, its sister component, the responsibility rebuild has elicited less scholarly 
and policy attention. The lack of attention to rebuilding responsibilities has been made all the 
more urgent by the violent aftermath of the first protection intervention in Libya in 2011. Against 
this backdrop, the article examines the way in which the responsibility to rebuild is understood and 
operationalized, with reference to   Ø ǯ, theatres of two recent protection 
interventions. The conceptual evolution of the responsibility to rebuild reveals a distinct shift 
towards a more statist understanding of the rebuilding phase; what was initially considered a part 
of the wider international protection responsibility has become to be viewed as a domestic 
responsibility. This recalibration of the responsibility to rebuild stems from  ǯ
Ǯǯ ?  the changes in the wider normative 
environment.  The more statist understanding of rebuilding responsibilities has manifested itself 
not only in the emphasis on domestic ownership of the rebuilding process in the wake of protection 
interventions but also in the reconceptualization of the wider international responsibility to 
rebuild as a narrower responsibility to assist in building the capacity of the state subjected to 
protection intervention. This has been problematic in policy terms as the attempt to build capacity 
through thǮǯ has resulted at best in negative peace and at worst 
in armed violence.  
 
Keywords:  responsibility to rebuild, responsibility to protect, Libya, Øǯ 
 
Introduction 
 
The recent intervention in Libya failed to bring an end to the debates on the salience of 
the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. Whilst for some the 2011 intervention 
signals the emergence of the principle as substantive norm in international politicsi, 
others point to the exceptional circumstances under which the consensus to intervene 
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was achieved and thus remain more cautious about the purported normative shift in the 
protection responsibilities from the state to the international realm.ii Although 
significant obstacles to the realisation of the responsibility to protect in practice remain, 
the principle has nonetheless altered the terms of debate on humanitarian 
interventions. Not only has it made it harder for states to ride roughshod over their own 
protection responsibilities outlined in international legal conventions, but perhaps 
more importantly it has rendered international inaction in the face of mass atrocities 
more controversial. iii 
 
If the responsibility to react to atrocities in other states has become an influential idea, 
then what of the associated concept of the responsibility to rebuild? Posing this 
question is of critical importance if we accept that interventions to halt atrocities alone 
are insufficient in meeting the protection responsibilities.iv Yet, the prevention and 
rebuilding components of the protection principle have attracted less interest, arguably 
due to the contested nature of the reactive pillar.  Although Bellamyv  and others have 
begun to address this lacuna with regard to the prevention responsibilities, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the notion of the duty to rebuild. The lack of systematic 
research on the issue has been made all the more urgent by events in Libya where the 
intervention in the name of the responsibility to protect was undertaken in 2011. Four 
years into the rebuilding phase marked by international disengagement, Libya has made 
little headway towards political stability or consolidated sovereignty. Rather than 
ushering forth a new peaceful Libya, the ousting of Gaddafi has resulted in continuing 
violence.  In Côte ǯ too, another case of where military force was used in the 
name of protecting populations from mass atrocities, lack of independent judiciary and 
reconciliation coupled with sporadic violence have threatened to undermine the aim of 
the R2P intervention to halt armed violence.  
 
In the light of this, the present paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the 
less-investigated element of the emerging idea of the responsibility to protect, the 
obligation to rebuild. The questions that motivate this paper concern the way in which 
the responsibility to rebuild is understood and operationalised; how the responsibility 
to rebuild is interpreted and understood by agents undertaking humanitarian 
interventions, the way in which it has been operationalised and ultimately, what the 
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implications are to the responsibility to protect principle at large. The discussion draws 
on the cases where R2P interventions have so far being undertaken; Libya and Côte ǯǤ providing a snapshot of the conceptǯ operationalisation rather than 
body of generalizable evidence, the cases provide an opportune moment to begin 
examining the aftermaths of protection interventions in two very different contexts.   
 
The findings of the analysis can be summarised as follows. The conceptual evolution of 
the responsibility to rebuild reveals a distinct shift towards a more statist 
understanding of the rebuilding phase; what was initially considered a part of the wider 
international protection responsibility has become to be viewed as a domestic 
responsibility. The more statist understanding of rebuilding responsibilities has 
manifested itself not only in emphasis on domestic ownership of the rebuilding process 
in the wake of protection interventions but also in the reconceptualization of the wider 
international responsibility to rebuild as a narrower responsibility to assist in building 
the capacity of the state subjected to protection intervention.  The recalibration of the 
responsibility to rebuild    ǯ    Ǯǯ
element of R2P as well as from the changes in the wider normative environment within 
which rebuilding operations exist.  In policy terms the change has been problematic as 
the attempt to build capacity through   Ǯǯ   
resulted at best in negative peace ȋØǯȌ and at worst in armed violence (Libya).  
Whilst the policy implications of the shift have been complex, the move towards 
emphasising domestic rebuilding responsibilities and espousing vague commitment to 
capacity-building has enabled the intervening states to maintain policy flexibility with 
regard to participating in post-intervention rebuilding missions.    
 
As suggested earlier, the line of enquiry developed here speaks to an overlooked 
dimension of the responsibility to protect. Particularly the early debates on the R2P 
focused almost exclusively on the responsibility to react. Some work has begun to 
address this gap in the analysis of R2Pvi. The task of theorising the responsibility to 
rebuild has, on the other hand, mainly been taken up Just War scholars. Jus post bellum 
theorists vii, focusing on just ending of wars, have begun to debate whether intervening 
forces have rebuilding obligations in the context of occupations and regime change 
operations. Much of the research has been motivated by the commonly, if not 
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universally, held view among just war theorists that the aftermath of an intervention is 
important to the justice of the intervention itself.  The question of who ought to bear 
rebuilding responsibilities following conventional wars, occupations and regime change 
operations has stimulated lively debate. Elshtain, for one, makes a moral case for the ǯ       the Pottery Barn principle of Ǯ  ǡ   ǯviii.  From another perspective, Pattisonix  argues that the 
collective international responsibility to rebuild war-torn or conflict-ridden states ought 
to be borne by actors most capable of doing so. In most cases the task of rebuilding 
would fall to the UN and other specialised statebuilding agencies. Others, however, see 
no logical connection between a just intervention and the rebuilding phase.  The 
argument here is that if an intervention meeting the Just War criteria has been 
undertaken to protect populations from mass atrocities, those carrying it out owe 
nothing  more to the protected populationsx.  In asking a set of questions about 
responsibilities of agents in the aftermath of wars, regime change operations and 
humanitarian interventions, Just War scholars have contributed to our understanding of 
the ethics of ending conflicts. Yet, beyond the moral debates of rebuilding 
responsibilities, a number of questions remain with respect to the understanding and 
operationalisation of the principle in practice.   
 
In the R2P literature, in turn, rebuilding responsibilities have been largely overlooked. 
An exception ǯxi  discussion of the concept. He argues that the third element    ?      ǯ        
flexible set of obligations than prevention and reaction. This was not in the interest of 
those undertaking interventions. Schnabel also suggests that the lessons of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding missions in the past decade - half-hearted or short-term 
engagement is unlikely to result in sustainable peace - have translated into reluctance to 
emphasise the rebuilding element of R2P.  This is clearly an important part of the puzzle 
of why the responsibility to rebuild has failed to gain traction in policy discussions. 
Schnabel, however, tells only a part of the story: states operates within normative 
structures and as a result, are informed by prevalent ideas about appropriate course of 
action.  Understanding why ideas such as the responsibility to rebuild fall out of favour 
requires not only attentiveness to state interests but also to changing norms on 
rebuilding missions.  This analysis, thus, seeks to add to our existing knowledge on the 
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responsibility to rebuild by tracing the evolution of the idea and its operationalization in 
the context of recent protection interventions. It will begin by tracing the evolution of 
the concept and then move onto to explaining why the conceptual change has occurred. 
Finally, the analysis turns to examining the ways in which rebuilding responsibilities are 
understood and operationalised in practice and what the implications to the R2P as a 
whole are.   
 
 
Responsibility to Protect  
 
The evolution of the responsibility to rebuild is best understood within the wider 
context the responsibility to protect.  The advent of the R2P owes much to the Kosovo 
intervention in 1999xii. The unauthorised and highly contested intervention in Kosovo 
raised concerns about the selective use of humanitarian interventions.xiii  This led the 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to call for consensus on the new parameters of 
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty. In response, the Canadian government 
established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)     Ǯ   ǯ   ? ? ? ?Ǥ  
contention of the report was that in cases where states failed to protect their citizens 
from atrocities and crimes against humanity the international community had the 
ultimate duty to protect and in doing so, use military intervention as a last resort.  The 
ICISS formulated a distinct continuum of responsibilities spanning from prevention to 
reaction and rebuilding. The preventative phase, according to the report, entailed     Ǥ  Ǯǯ ǡ  ǡ   
obligation to take action in the face oǮǯxiv if the state in question 
was unwilling or unable to do so. This, as the report suggests, could translate into 
military intervention in extreme circumstances.  
 
The final element of the principle was the responsibility to rebuild, which stipulated 
post-protection intervention obligation to assist with reconstruction and peacebuilding 
efforts. The continuum of responsibilities was guided by the rationale that reaction on 
its own is bound to be ineffective; credible protection of civilians requires prevention 
and rebuilding.  In this sense, then, the three pillars developed in the ICISS report were 
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intimately interlinked and seen as a whole that is greater than a sum of its parts. While 
the vision put forth by the Commission received endorsement from the UN Secretary 
Generalxv, a number of states expressed reservation about the principle.  Developing 
countries in particular saw R2P as a pretext for intervention. These concerns were 
reflected in the conceptualisation of the R2P in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome 
Document; while member states expressed their commitment to the responsibility to 
protect, the obligations of states were foregrounded at the expense of international 
protection responsibilities.  
 
 
Evolution of the Idea  
 
Concept with much longer pedigree than the R2P is the notion of rebuilding of war-torn 
states. The Marshall Plan is often mistakenly seen as the predecessor of what is known 
today as statebuilding. Williamsxvi identifies the Boer War as the first conflict followed 
by a systematic attempt by an external actor, Great Britain, to reconstruct the war-torn 
state. The British sought to reform the administrative structures and industry, alongside 
the policy of promoting English settlement in the Boer republics xvii. The inter-war 
period, in turn, witnessed a multilateral rebuilding attempt in Austria where the League 
of Nations initiated an extensive economic rebuilding project. War had destroyed the ǯǯl centre 
that could stimulate economic growth in Europe, the League developed a plan to reform ǯprotectorate xviii. Two decades later, 
the US-led reconstruction of Germany and Japan entailed similar protectorate-style 
transfer of authority to the occupying force. The aim of the United States was to ensure 
rapid economic recovery and democratisation in Europe in order not only to alleviate 
suffering but also to realise economic and geopolitical policy goals.  
 
During the Cold War years engagement in post-war societies was largely viewed 
through the prism of superpower competition. The end of the Cold War enabled not 
only the dispatching UN peacekeepers to conflict zones but also the establishment of 
what has becom   ǮǯǤ  ǡ    the 1992 ǮǯǡǮ
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             ǯxix  
Whereas the earlier reconstruction efforts were characterised by attempts to rebuild 
the status quoxx, the new post-Cold War peacebuilding missions aimed at transforming 
it.  Essential to peacebuilding missions has been the attempt to address the root causes 
of conflict, whether poverty or structural injustice. The human security-oriented focus 
underpinning peacebuilding began to be overshadowed by emphasis on strengthening 
state capacity in the wake of 9/11xxi. Effective state and legitimate institutional 
structures were seen as the best guarantors of stability. This meant growing emphasis 
on so- Ǯǯ     -conflict states. Statebuilding 
missions became intertwined with counter-terrorism as state failure and weakness 
were seen as major causes of terrorism.  
 
Although the ICISS was concerned of obligations following protection interventions 
rather than post-conflict states more generally speaking, it is against this intellectual 
background that the idea of responsibility to rebuild is best understood.  The ICISS 
sought to represent rebuilding as an obligation rather than a right realised only when ǯ     Ǥ       
regarded as occupations are coded in international law, the Commission put forth a set 
of ideas relating to the responsibilities of the international community following 
protection interventions. Rebuilding was to be understood as a prescriptive (an 
obligation) rather than merely a permissive (a right) norm.  To this end, the 2001 ICISS 
report sketched out a set of priorities for the rebuilding phase. Security, the Commission 
argued, is one of the primary elements of effective rebuilding strategy. It envisaged a 
role for international actors in realising both immediate concerns, such as ensuring 
order, and longer-term rebuilding tasks. Justice and reconciliation are highlighted by 
the Commission as equally important tasks for the rebuilding phase. Judicial reform is 
considered vital for the realisation of the longer-term ability of the state in question to 
protect the rights of its citizens. Finally, development is identified as the third priority in 
the rebuilding phase; economic growth, employment and steady incomes are identified 
as the key elements disincentivizing return to violence.  
 
The report created a temporal association between intervention and rebuilding: the 
rebuilding phase is represented as a follow-up for the use of military force for 
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protection purposes. This implies that rebuilding is part of the policy toolkit only in 
extreme cases, where military force is used as a final resortxxii. As to the agents who 
ought to realise such responsibilities, the Commission identified the UN as the key actor 
in the rebuilding stage of R2P. Although the report was highly sensitive of the 
detrimental effects of externally-imposed rebuilding process and emphasised the role of 
local authorities as partners, it made a case for post-intervention engagement lengthy 
enough to ensure stabilisation and sustainable peace xxiii. Hasty exit or lack of rebuilding 
strategy, according to the Commission, would be irresponsible and may ultimately 
undermine the credibility of the responsibility to protect principle.xxiv  Following the    ǯ ǡ        was 
lent credence by the endorsement of the UN Secretary General and the 2004 High Level   ǡ   Ǥ       ǯǯum 
of protection responsibilities, ranging from prevention and reaction to rebuildingxxv. 
  
At the same time however, states were much more reserved about the international 
duty to rebuild. This was evident in the omission of the responsibility to rebuild element 
of R2P in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document. In the negotiations on the 
content and wording of the R2P paragraphs the notion of continuum of international 
responsibilities before, during and after humanitarian crises outlined by the ICISS made 
way for the emphasis on preventative action as the main international responsibility. 
Although handful of governments, such as those of Mexico, Chile and New Zealand, 
made references to the sequential nature of international responsibilities as suggested 
in the ICISS report, the positions of many governments had shifted towards 
emphasising prevention as the main international obligationxxvi. The shift away from 
rebuilding responsibilities and towards prevention was particularly evident in the 
positions of China, Russia and the non-aligned movement (Egypt, Cuba, Iran, India, ȌǤ  ?ǡǡǮǥ

to insist a mediatory role in inter-state conflicts. But even in internal situations, an early        ǯxxvii. In another statement, Pakistan 
made a case for development assistance, fairer terms of international trade and debt 
relief as a way for developed countries to realise their protection responsibilitiesxxviii.  
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Even proponents of the R2P, such as Canada and Sweden, referred to the need to 
emphasise prevention while remaining silent on rebuilding responsibilitiesxxix.  
Similarly, the United States, expressing indirect support for R2P without directly 
referring to international responsibilities, advocated a focus on preventative 
measuresxxx.  
 
The focus on 
ǯ ? ? ? ? ǮǯǤ ?
substituted by three pillars consisting of the protection responsibilities of the state 
(pillar I), international assistance and capacity-building (pillar II) and timely and 
decisive response (pillar III).  It is Pillar II that is most relevant for the purpose of 
understanding the evolution of the responsibility to rebuild idea; it sought to coalesce 
both preventative and rebuilding tasks under the rubric of international assistance and 
capacity-Ǥǯ
deal with armed rebellion and structural measures support for governance reforms 
were identified as pillar two commitments of international actors. These 
responsibilities were dispersed among a myriad of international development and 
human rights actors, including the international financial institutions, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEFxxxi, regional organisations such as the OSCE xxxii 
and finally, donor governmentsxxxiii. This reorganisation of R2P enabled the divorcing of    Ǯǯ      ng it with 
preventative tasks.  
 
Whereas the pillar II commitments outlined in the 2009 report were both broad and 
vague and focused primarily on preventative measures, more detailed explanation of 
pillar II tasks can be found in the subsequent reports by the UN Secretary General. In 
making a case for R2P as a process of building responsible sovereigns, the Secretary 
General argued in his 2012 report that pillar II activities should ensure that states have 
the capacity to meet their pillar I responsibilities and reduce the future need for pillar 
III action xxxiv. More recently, the 2014 report elaborates on the Pillar II 
commitmentsxxxv. The leitmotif of the report is the reinforcement of the capacity of 
states to meet their protection responsibilities. The Pillar II, according to the report, is 
premised upon set of five principles; national ownership, mutual commitment to build 
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resilience by both domestic and external actorsǡ Ǯ  ǯ by ensuring that 
international assistance does not contribute to the development of circumstances 
leading to atrocity crimes, prioritisation of prevention and finally, flexibility in terms of 
addressing root causes of conflict which vary from society to society.  
 
What is notable in these follow-up reports is the gradual de-emphasis on international 
responsibilities under Pillar II in favour of more statist understanding of Pillar II 
commitments. Alongside the above mentioned 2014 report, the most direct articulation 
of this can be found in the 2011 report on the role of regional organisations in 
implementing R2P which regards rebuilding responsibilities to lie squarely with the 
domestic authorities.  This indicates that with the reorganisation of the R2P into three 
pillars in the 2009 report more than terminology on rebuilding responsibilities has 
changed; not only are post-intervention rebuilding tasks conflated with preventative, 
capacity-building measures but the locale of responsibilities has shifted from the 
international to domestic. The outcome, in the aftermaths of the two Pillar III 
interventions so far, has been the policy of domestically-led statebuilding.  This, as will 
be argued in the latter part of the paper, has not been conducive to the overall aim of the 
R2P to prevent conflict.   
 
 
 
Explaining and Interpreting the Conceptual Shift 
 
What accounts for these changes? To provide an answer to this question, it is necessary 
to turn to the normative environment within which rebuilding operations exist. 
RǮǯexisting normative structures  is 
critical factor when it comes to the translation of an idea into a normxxxvi. While 
occasionally major turning points such as conflicts or conscience-shocking events 
prompt the emergence of a norm that challenges the existing normative framework in a 
given issue area, generally ideas tend to be more acceptable if they fit with the existing 
set of normsxxxvii. In similar vein, Florinixxxviii argues that the success or failure of new 
ideas is determined in part by how well they interact the dominant norms in the issue 
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area. These insights are important to an understanding of the recalibration of the 
rebuilding responsibilities that goes beyond narrow focus on material interests.   
 
In terms of thinking about the set of the existing norms on humanitarian interventions, 
the tension between sovereignty and such interventions is well-established. Solving this 
tension was, indeed, the rationale behind R2P. Yet, the notion of shared protection 
responsibilities proposed by the ICISS was unsuccessful in gaining traction with many 
developing countries. They opposed the initial conceptualisation of R2P as it was 
regarded as a permit for Western interventionism. It was in fact these concerns that also 
rendered the rebuilding element unacceptable; as the international responsibilities 
were seen as a continuum, rebuilding phase would be preceded by international 
protection interventions on which no consensus existedxxxix.  As the former UN Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Edward Luck, has pointed out, this sequential 
element, coǯ
the implementation of the R2P rendered the notion of responsibility to rebuild 
unacceptable to a number of statesxl.  This was evident in the fact that no reference was 
made to the responsibility to rebuild in the decision to establish Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC) in the World Summit where the R2P in its initial form was discussed.  
While the Commission would have been the logical institutional home of the 
responsibility to rebuild, developing countries demanded the divorcing of the PBC from 
R2P principles xli.  As a result, the PBC has played no role in rebuilding operations in 
post-R2P environments. 
 
If the prevalence of sovereignty rendered the idea of international rebuilding 
responsibilities short-lived, it is also necessary to understand the ideational changes 
that were taking place in the wider normative environment on peacebuilding, 
statebuilding and donor-relations. The argument here is that the idea of responsibility 
to rebuild emerged into unfavourable normative environment: whist the ICISS proposed 
international rebuilding obligations, the wider ideas underpinning post-conflict 
operations and donor-relations reflected the opposite trend. The donor conditionality-
driven development and post-conflict rebuilding strategies began to be replaced by an 
approach emphasising national ownership in the late 1990s, formalised in the 2005 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectivenessxlii. The Paris Principles, prioritising nationally-led 
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development strategies, have since become influential in the context of post-conflict 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. This is evident, for instance, in the UN Peacebuilding 
CommissionǯǢ   Ǯ-
groǯ ilding policiesxliii. Moreover, the presence of developing country 
representatives in the Commission has ensured that the Paris Principles are 
incorporated into the UN peacebuilding missions.xliv  More recently, the New Deal on 
Peacebuilding developed by the G7 countries together with conflict-affected states and 
aid agencies under the rubric of International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding, is premised on an emphasis on local ownership of capacity-building. Its Ǯtransitioning out of fragility is long, political work that     ǥ    
national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that 
underestimate the importance of harmǤǤǯxlv  
 
This shift away from top-down, externally-imposed peacebuilding and statebuilding 
strategies reflect the process of policy learning; heavy-handed rebuilding interventions 
in the 1990s in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor produced dependency and undermined 
domestic capacity-building and conflict resolution. The Council of Europe, for instance, 
noted in its 2005 assessment of the post-conflict rebuilding process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that the quasi-protectorate-model of statebuilding deployed in the country 
was deeply problematic from the point of view of democratisation and, ultimately, 
Bosnian sovereignty.xlvi Perhaps more critical part of the policy learning process has 
been realisation that imposition of statebuilding reforms is unlikely to result in 
legitimate and sustainable peace, as evidenced by the long-drawn out and expensive 
rebuilding processes in the Western Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq.  Particularly 
the latter two have rendered so-Ǯǯ
states.           
ǯ  ? ? ? ?
report on Pillar II where the potential of external assistance in capacity-building do 
more harm than good is a reoccurring theme.  
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Operationalisation of Pillar II Commitments 
 
In what way, then, are Pillar II commitments realised in practice following protection 
interventions? The aftermaths of protection interventio   ? ? ? ?    Üǯvoire provide an opportunity to develop some initial answers in the context of two 
very different cases.  To begin with the Libyan case, the international policy after the 
2011 intervention has been one of disengagementxlvii. Four years into the rebuilding 
phase, Libya has made little headway towards political stability or consolidated 
sovereignty. Conflict in the new Libyan state has been fueled by a vicious cycle whereby 
the numerous armed groups that formed during the anti-Gaddafi rebellion have little 
faith in institutions of the state and those occupying it, while those holding positions in 
the new governing bodies advocate the incorporation of the armed factions to the 
official security apparatus of the state. The armed groups, refusing to disarm as former 
Gaddafi supporters are part of the new governance structures, fill the security and 
judicial vacuum by running prisons and conducting (often arbitrary) arrestsxlviii. The 
post-intervention governments have had little success in asserting their authority over 
myriad of armed brigades who fear the infiltration of the new governance arrangements 
by figures active the former Gaddafi regime. No substantive disarmament, 
demobilization and rehabilitation process has taken place due the inability of the Libyan 
authorities to credibly enforce the process xlix.  In the past year the political tensions 
have boiled over into armed violence and the formation of two rival governments, the 
internationally-recognized administration in the eastern city of Tobruk and the Tripoli- 
based General National Congress (GNC). 
 
Despite the deep divisions within the country that transpired soon after the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime, rebuilding measures such as reconciliation and transitional justice 
highlighted by the ICISS took a back seat in ǯ. The 
overall locus of international assistance in the immediate aftermath of the intervention 
was on securityǡǯ. While being supportive of 
the attempt by the Libyan authorities to stabilise the country, the focus on border 
security arguably reflected the prioritisation of aspects of security pertinent to 
interveninǯǤǡwas placed on 
creating the security apparatus of the Libyan state that could effectively deal with 
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transnational problems such as terrorism, weapons smuggling and migration. Little 
evidence can be found in the immediate aftermath of the intervention of engagement in 
comprehensive or coherent capacity-building assistance by donor governments as 
outlined in 
ǯ R2P and capacity-building under Pillar II.  
Although the establishment of more extensive peace mission in post-intervention Libya 
was out of question due to domestic concern that presence of foreign peacekeepers 
would undermine the legitimacy of the new government, Libyan authorities requested 
technical advice and assistancel.  Some aid initiatives were planned Ȃ such as the 
training of the Libyan army by the US military Ȃ and others executed Ȃ  namely,  the 
Security, Justice and Defense Programme launched by the UK in 2013 to facilitate 
security sector reform Ȃ but ultimately the Libyan authorities were left alone in 
addressing the post-Gaddafi security vacuum.  
 
The only major international rebuilding body in Libya has been the UN Support Mission 
in Libya (UNSMIL).  The cornerstone of the UN involvement in the post-intervention 
phase has been the emphasis on the principle of national ownership; this has meant 
domestic responsibility for building sustainable peace and establishing the strategy for 
doing so li.  Beyond the UN, similar line of thinking is echoed in the statements following 
high level international conferences on Libya, namely those held in London (2011) and 
Paris (2013).  Registering concern with the deteriorating security situation in the 
country, the 2013 Paris Communiquelii     Ǯ   ǯ       ǤǤǤǯǤ  The only domain where 
international actors were seen as having distinct protection responsibilities was 
securityliii. In acknowledging the S ǯ ion mandate, the document 
pointed out the continued duty of NATO to protect following the end of the Gaddafi 
regimeliv.  As suggested above, such responsibility has so far not being met.  It is only 
recently that the approach of the major powers to Libya has begun to change; the rise of 
the Islamic State in Libya and the growing migration crisis in the Mediterranean have 
pushed Libya back into the ǯ foreign policy agendas.  After failed attempts 
to broker peace between the warring factions in 2014, UN-led peace talks in 2015 led to 
signing of an agreement that may lead to the establishment of unity government.  Yet, at 
the time of writing, the GNC alongside key militias have refused to sign the agreement 
which has added weight to the calls for external military intervention in the country.   
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The aftermath of the proÜǯvoire differs in many ways from 
that of Libya. Whereas the international commitment on the post-intervention 
rebuilding process in the Libyan case has been weak at best, a more comprehensive UN-
led peacebuilding opera     Ü ǯvoire. The operation is a 
continuation of the decade long UN presence in the country and as such, builds upon 
existing peacebuilding mission. Following the 2011 intervention the newly established 
government of Alassane Outtara received extensive foreign aid from France and the EU.  
The combined donations of France and the EU amounted to over $700million, the bulk 
of which was directed towards social spendinglv. It is notable that much of the 
international rebuilding presence in the country rests on the former colonial power 
France and, as commentators have pointed outlvi, ultimately on its interests in the 
region.  Telling of ǯon the distribution of rebuilding responsibilities in the 
rebuilding phase is the statement issued in the immediate aftermath of the intervention. 
President Sarkozy emphasised that Ǯ	e the stability 
of any government whatsoever, even if it is a friendly government. Ivoirians must be the ǯlvii. It is often argued that the French policy of African reflects an attempt 
to consolidate political and economic power of France in the continentlviii and in such 
context, the above declaration represents nothing more than lip service to Ivorian 
sovereignty.  Yet, what makes the statement interesting from the vantage point of 
norms is that the French government deemed necessary to refer to domestic ownership 
and responsibility of the rebuilding process.  As long line of research on ideas and 
norms in world politics has shown, the ways in which states justify particularly courses 
of action are indicative of the normative environment within which policy-makers 
operatelix.  In this context ǯs statement indicates the emergence of the norm of 
national responsibility/ownership of the rebuilding process, as argued earlier.  The 
notion of domest       	ǯ
engagement in the country, but also that of the UN. As the UNSMIL in Libya, the UN 
Operation  Ø ǯ (UNOCI) has emphasised national ownership of and 
responsibility over the rebuilding process lx. Even immediate post-intervention tasks, 
such as organising elections, traditionally the bread and butter of the UN peacebuilding 
missions have been transferred to domestic actorslxi.   
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The Ivorian rebuilding process since the 2011 intervention has largely focused on 
stimulating economic growth and reconstructing the physical infrastructure and 
significant progress has been achieved in this regard.  Despite successes in the economic 
sphere, peace in Ü ǯ remains of negative kind. As in Libya, the post-
intervention phase has been characterised by what is often referred to as ǯ
justicelxii. The judicial system is highly politicised and lacks independence; prosecutions 
following the electoral violence that led to the protection intervention have targeted ǯ   
   ǡ     
forces loyal to Outtara have so far remained uninvestigated.  Although international 
human rights organisations have raised concerns over the lack of impartial transitional 
justice, international pressure on Outtara in this regard has been modest lxiii.   
 
Competition over land ownership has been one of the key drivers of inter-communal 
conflict in the country and as such, key to addressing the root causes of conflict.  In line 
with the ethos of domestic rebuilding responsibilities, the UNOCI has left resolving land 
disputes to domestic authoritieslxiv.  Yet, as Mitchelllxv points out, four years into the 
rebuilding process this fundamental source of conflict has been neglected by the 
Outtara government. Land distribution has, in fact, become an important source of 
power and influence in Ivorian politics; government officials are allegedly involved in 
illicit distribution of landlxvi. Coupled with unresolved political questions, nationalism, 
expressed in the notion of Ivoirité,  Ǯǯ Ivoirians 
and non-native groups, has been used by political elites to fuel inter-communal conflict 
which has undermined the process of reconciliation.  As the UNOCI is winding down its 
presence, the direction of political development after the 2011 intervention has been 
towards the pre-intervention status quo rather than building resilient and capable 
statelxvii.   
 
In both cases post-intervention rebuilding responsibilities are understood as distinctly 
domestic obligations, even if the extent of international engagement is different.   It 
would be simplistic to attribute the difficulties faced by Libyans and Ivoirians in the 
wake of the respective protection interventions to this factor alone. In both cases lack of 
agreement on political issues, such as constitutional arrangements or land ownership, 
have been major sources of conflict. It is clear that resolving such issues in a legitimate 
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manner requires domestic ownership of the process.  However, the cases highlight the 
problems that transferring the responsibility of post-intervention rebuilding to the 
domestic sphere with limited international engagement has resulted in.  As noted 
earlier, Pillar II commitments in the aftermath of protection interventions have been 
largely been represented in terms of conflict prevention. Preventative measures consist 
of building a strong and stable institutions of state; representative governmental 
institutions, independent judiciary and security forces, inter alia. Although in the long 
run such statebuilding measures may be conducive to peace and stability, in the short-
run the process of statebuilding often has the opposite effect. Statebuilding has 
historically been, and still is, a process that generates instability and at times, violence 
lxviii.  This is so as the reconfiguration of power, central to the statebuilding process, 
creates winners, losers and contestation as elites jockey for power. This is nowhere 
more evident than in Libya where armed struggle for power in the post-R2P 
intervention power vacuum has prompted some to raise the prospect for further Ǥ  Ø ǯire, too, human rights monitors have documented violence ǯ
ǯǤn the short-run then Pillar 
II activities may in fact generate greater need for Pillar III action instead of making it 
less likely.  The emphasis on the responsibilities of domestic agents who may not have 
the capacity to halt violence or who may themselves be the sources of instability sits 
rather uneasily with the strategy of creating resilient and capable states through 
statebuilding.  
 
A related point is that while the move away from externally-driven rebuilding processes 
is clearly a welcome development, the discourse on domestic obligations in the context 
of R2P serves to legitimize weak international commitment to follow through protection 
interventions where the immediate interests of the intervening states are not at stake.  
Rather than tying states into a responsibility to rebuild, the notion of domestic 
rebuilding obligations and the consequent Pillar II commitment by other states to assist 
in such process has in effect allowed states to retain more flexibility in their decisions to 
contribute to rebuilding operations. This stands in contrast to accounts that see the 
responsibility to rebuild as a rhetorical device to legitimize coercive liberal 
interventionismlxix.  In Libya more extensive international engagement has coincided 
with the wider concerns about the Islamic State and the gains it has made in Libya, 
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whereas in Øǯ	ǯis seen to stem 
from its attempts to consolidate influence in Africa lxx. Although there is much to be said 
for the benefits of grounding the longer-term rebuilding and peacebuilding on domestic 
ownership, the cases raise the urgent question of whether these processes can be 
initiated without stronger commitment on the rebuilding phase by international actors.    
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper was motivated by the question of what happened to the idea of 
responsibility to rebuild which has largely disappeared out of policy and academic 
debates.  It has been shown that what began as a set of clearly defined international 
obligations in the wake of protection interventions, has transformed into much broader 
and opaque Pillar II commitments to assist states following protection interventions. 
ǯ
strategies of donor governments and international statebuilding agencies on the ground 
reflect the shift away from international rebuilding responsibilities to distinctly 
domestic obligations. This conceptual recalibration has occurred because of the 
association the responsibility to rebuild with its more contested counterpart, the 
responsibility to react. At the same time, changes in the wider ideational environment 
within which rebuilding operations function rendered the notion of international 
rebuilding responsibilities short-lived.  ThØǯ
to the tension underpinning the simultaneous trend towards domestic responsibilities 
and the focus of R2P on prevention. Prevention, sought to achieve through the process 
of statebuilding, tends to generate instability. The capacity, and in certain cases the will, 
of domestic actors to effectively address this is often limited.  This raises the question of 
what the aims of protection interventions are; bringing an end to violence or generating 
more positive forms of peace?  The cases suggest that whereas much of the controversy 
on R2P has so far related to the implementation of the Pillar III, weak commitment to 
rebuilding may represent equal, if not, greater obstacle to the realisation of R2P. 
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